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The Panic of 1857: Origins, 
Transmission, and Containment 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND LARRY SCHWEIKART 
We explain the origins of the Panic of 1857, examine its spread, and compare state 
banking systems' responses. We describe the decline in western land and railroad 
investments and the consequent stress on securities brokers and banks in eastern 
cities, and trace the transmission of the shock to other regions. Bank performance 
depended not only on regional conditions and links to eastern banks, but on the 
ability to coordinate behavior. Southern branch banks and coinsuring banks in 
Ohio and Indiana were particularly successful. 
( ontemporaries disagreed on the origins of the Panic of 1857. Hunt's 
'-Merchants' Magazine published a partisan attack by Nathan Ap- 
pleton, a prominent Boston banker, on New York City banks for 
contracting loans beside an explanation appealing to inexplicable 10- 
year cycles of financial distress.1 J. S. Gibbons also criticized New York 
City banks for contracting loans, but attributed their problem, in part, to 
deposit withdrawals by New York country banks.2 D. Morier Evans 
blamed excessive speculation by banks and firms.3 B. Douglass & Co. 
pointed out that the panic had occurred during a prosperous harvest and 
attributed the "financial revulsion" to "terror inspired by a trifling 
cause or misapprehension of danger."4 The Banking Superintendent of 
New York, James Cook, described the panic as "without apparent 
reason derived from past experience."5 
Some facts were consistent with the view that the crisis was an 
unnecessary product of mismanagement or fear. First, the period 
immediately prior to the panic was one of unusual calm in the markets 
for commercial bills. From January through August of 1857, interest 
rates on commercial bills reported in Bankers' Magazine varied well 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec. 1991). C The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The authors are Visiting Associate Professor of Finance, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, and Associate Professor of History, University of Dayton, 
Dayton, OH 45469. 
We thank Michael Bordo, Louis Cain, Albert Fishlow, Gary Gorton, Jonathan Hughes, Naomi 
Lamoreaux, Joel Mokyr, Edwin Perkins, Roger Ransom, Hugh Rockoff, Christina Romer, Richard 
Sutch, Richard Sylla, Peter Temin, Thomas Weiss, Gavin Wright, and two anonymous referees for 
comments, and James Johnson for excellent assistance. 
'Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 37 (1857), pp. 592-95. 
2 Gibbons, The Banks of New York, p. 2. 
3Evans, History of the Commercial Crisis. 
4 B. Douglas & Co., "The Failures in America," reprinted in Evans, History of the Commercial 
Crisis, pp. 122-34. 
5Cook, "Annual Report," p. 105. 
807 
808 Calomiris and Schweikart 
within the ranges of previous years.6 Weekly reports of Thompson's 
Bank Note and Commercial Reporter indicated little adverse news 
regarding banks; often it described conditions in money markets from 
January through August as "easy." Second, the panic was resolved 
quickly; New York City banks suspended on October 13 and resumed 
on December 11. Third, few banks failed during the panic, indicating 
that the underlying disturbance to bank portfolios was small relative to 
overall bank capital. It would be hard, however, to argue that New York 
City banks caused the panic. Peter Temin has shown that New York 
City banks contracted loans only in response to a continuing specie 
drain. Moreover, suspensions in other eastern cities (Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and Washington) preceded New York's suspension by three 
weeks. 
Explanations of the panic encounter difficulties in explaining the 
timing and location of its onset in the East. George Van Vleck saw the 
panic as a result of the decline in British capital inflows to the United 
States, causing a decline of American securities prices, the failure of the 
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust (Ohio Life), and a run on other banks.7 
But Temin argued that capital inflows remained large in 1857. Further- 
more, Van Vleck failed to provide a convincing story of the timing of the 
securities market decline, and data on securities prices do not show a 
general decline in July and August. Finally, Van Vleck did not demon- 
strate how the securities price declines were linked to the banking panic. 
Albert Fishlow argued that the panic was a symptom of a recession that 
began in 1856, induced by declining investment in railroads that had 
begun in 1854.8 Fishlow has identified an important source of the panic, 
but he has not explained the timing of the decline in 1857 or the links 
between railroad securities and banks. Temin conjectured that the panic 
may have resulted from fears of a repetition of the Panic of 1837 in 
response to a moderate rise in British interest rates (which he argued 
caused the Panic of 1837).9 The problem with this explanation is that the 
tightness in British markets peaked in the spring of 1857. From April to 
August 1857, the Bank of England accumulated gold, while its discount 
rate fell from 6.5 percent to 5.5 percent.'0 
Authors have assigned varying importance to the failure on August 24 
of Ohio Life, an Ohio-based bank with large mortgage holdings, which 
maintained an office in New York and acted as an intermediary for other 
Ohio banks investing in eastern financial markets. This was the first 
major financial institution to experience troubles just prior to the panic, 
6 Temin, "The Panic of 1857," pp. 1-12. 
7 Van Vleck, The Panic of 1857. 
8 Fishlow, American Railroads, pp. 100-16. 
9 Temin, "The Panic of 1857," and The Jacksonian Economy. 
10 Jevons, Investigations, appended diagram I; and Hawtrey, A Century of Bank Rate, p. 281. 
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and some viewed its demise as a propagator of financial unrest.11 But its 
influence on other banks remains doubtful. First, its failure was known 
at the time to have been caused by inappropriate (and possibly fraudu- 
lent) activities by its management and thus might have had a trivial 
effect on the perceived risk of other banks' liabilities. Second, its demise 
preceded by a month the earliest suspensions of banks elsewhere. 
Finally, banks most directly linked to Ohio Life-correspondent banks 
in Ohio-were reimbursed at the time of the bank's failure with no loss. 
Only one bank failed in Ohio during the panic; the others avoided 
suspending convertibility by credibly coinsuring one another against 
runs. 
The following questions remain about the origins of the panic. What 
caused banks in eastern cities to suspend convertibility? How could a 
disturbance with small consequences for banks ex post (one that 
resulted in few bank failures) cause nearly universal financial disruption 
and suspension of convertibility? What caused Ohio Life to fail, and 
how was its failure linked to the general suspension? 
Recently, economists have developed models capable of answering 
the second question. Charles Calomiris and Gary Gorton reviewed 
these models and argued that during the National Banking Era panics 
occurred when depositors realized that an important adverse shock had 
occurred but did not know the precise extent or incidence of the shock 
among banks.12 Disturbances that instigate panics need not be large 
relative to aggregate bank capital and need not be expected to result in 
large numbers of bank liquidations. Periods prior to panics involved 
unusually bad news about bank assets, including stock price declines, 
commodity price declines, and increased commercial failures. 
Similarly, our explanation for the origin of the Panic of 1857 revolves 
around the financing of western railroad and land speculation in eastern 
financial markets. The proximate cause of the panic was the bankruptcy 
of securities brokers who borrowed from eastern banks to finance their 
dealings in the stock and bond markets. To understand the panic's 
origins, one must begin with the economic and political history of the 
speculative boom and bust in investments in the West during the 1850s. 
The function of securities markets changed drastically in the United 
States in the decade prior to the panic. In addition to state and federal 
bond issues, investors traded large amounts of securities issued by 
private companies. These securities consisted mainly of railroad bonds 
and stocks, and to a lesser extent bank stock, miscellaneous corporate 
securities, and warrants to western lands. Substantial investment in new 
roads, financed by a booming market for speculative railroad securities 
" Gibbons, The Banks of New York; and Speigelman, "The Failure of the Ohio Life." 
12 Calomiris and Gorton, "The Origins of Banking Panics." 
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in the East, characterized the early 1850s.13 Different railroads' earnings 
followed different paths as the course of American development 
changed over time. By the mid-1850s railroads could be grouped 
usefully into three categories: eastern roads that served established 
routes; older western roads built mainly to serve local distribution 
needs; and newer western roads, sometimes financed through special 
land grants to serve as trunk lines connecting older areas of settlement 
and eastern markets with new areas of settlement. As early as 1854, 
older locally oriented roads in the West found their earnings falling and 
their opportunities shrinking, as a result of competition from the new 
trunk lines. These new lines, with their aggressive land-purchasing 
policies and far-reaching plans for transcontinental expansion, provided 
the principal speculative opportunities for railroad investors of the 
1850s. Their fortunes depended on a continuing inflow of settlers and the 
growth of commerce on the frontier, which required confidence in the 
viability of expansion westward. 
In the spring of 1857 confidence abounded. The Cincinnati Enquirer 
reported "railroad fever" associated with the completion of the South- 
ern Illinois Railroad through Ohio, especially the Cincinnati-St. Louis 
link. 14 According to Allen Nevins, a "fever of speculation in Kansas 
lands was raging, men selling homes, giving up well paid positions, and 
even borrowing money at ten percent to purchase farms." Newspapers 
published along travel routes to Kansas in early 1857 described "a 
veritable torrent of humanity." The lure of Kansas lands led some to 
expect Kansas to "increase by seventy thousand people that year." 15 In 
April settlers arrived at the rate of 1,000 per day. 
The link between immigrant traffic and expectations of railroad 
profitability is visible in the responses to this great influx. As passengers 
to Kansas increased, the roads lowered rates for through traffic, 
indicating expectations of a lasting increase in the volume of business 
(and perhaps the railroads' desire to encourage immigration to stimulate 
development). They advertised rate reductions of up to 25 percent. 
Entrepreneurs laid ambitious plans for new railroads. For example, the 
Leavenworth Herald reported on May 9, 1857, plans to build a railroad 
to connect with the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad. Entrepreneurs of 
these projected railroads included important politicians such as Senator 
Bigler of Pennsylvania, who had a business partner in Fort Scott, 
Kansas. Bigler's partner had invested in extensive railroad construc- 
tion, "for he thought [Fort Scott] would become the principal railway 
center of southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas... 
Town lots passed through "a dozen hands within sixty days" as 
speculators looked to a continual influx of settlers and to expanded rail 
13 Fishlow, American Railroads. 
14 Cincinnati Enquirer, Apr. 16, 1857. 
15 Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union, p. 156. 
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links. Newly appointed territorial Governor Robert Walker, arriving in 
Kansas in May, quickly found himself in opposition to the speculators 
who grabbed the best land, "especially along projected railroad 
routes. "16 
By late summer that optimism was shattered, the value of western 
land fell and the speculative railroad securities fell with it. Table 1 
provides data on various securities for selected dates surrounding the 
panic and reveals important differences in price movements across 
different types of securities. Prices were rising or flat from the beginning 
of 1857 until March, and an upward trend is particularly pronounced for 
three of the four trunk-line stocks for which data exist for early 1857 and 
for Ohio Life. Prices remained flat or fell for these stocks from March to 
the end of May. By late July a substantial depreciation in trunk-line 
stocks occurred, while other securities' prices remained constant or fell 
slightly. From July to early September, trunk-line securities, Kansas 
land warrants, and stock in Ohio Life fell dramatically (Ohio Life 
suspended on August 24). Meanwhile, the values of other securities 
show little or no change. The free fall in trunk-line stocks continued up 
to September 23 with little or no effect on other securities prices. During 
the onset of the liquidity crisis in early October (after general bank 
suspension in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and before 
suspension in New York), the prices of New York state bonds and 
eastern railroad stocks declined along with trunk-line stocks. After 
October 21, recovery began, and by the end of the year (by which time 
New York banks had resumed convertibility) securities prices were 
roughly at their September 2 levels. Data from the beginning and end of 
1859 show that trunk-line stocks continued on a downward trend after 
the panic had passed, while other securities followed an upward or flat 
trend. 
The decline in speculative railroads' earnings and prospects forced 
several companies into default, including the Illinois Central, the Erie & 
Pittsburgh, the Fort Wayne & Chicago, and the Reading lines. Several 
thinly capitalized railroad companies-including the Delaware, the 
Lackawanna & Western, and the Fond du Lac-went bankrupt. 
Additional evidence supports the view that mid-1857 represented a 
turning point in expectations about the profitability of westward expan- 
sion. According to Paul Gates, the first Kansas public lands had been 
put up for sale in 1856 and early 1857, and "for the most part 
settler-claimants secured the lands" at an average of $1.83 an acre, or 
approximately 83 cents above that which the settlers who had military 
warrants had paid.'7 The rapid decline in Kansas land values in 1857 
brought foreclosure on mortgaged land and general commercial distress. 
16 Crawford, Bigler Papers, cited in Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union, p. 158. 
17 Gates, "Land and Credit Problems," pp. 47, 49. 
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Of the 102 mortgages in Osage County, 45 met with foreclosure from 
1858 to 1860. Of the 246 mortgages in Anderson County, 81 were 
foreclosed between 1857 and 1861. In Lyon County, 54 of 366 mortgages 
were foreclosed, and some predicted that as many as two-thirds of the 
mortgages would end up in foreclosure.18 Data on commercial failure 
rates and losses by creditors of failed firms (Table 2) show that 
agricultural areas in the Northwest were particularly hard-hit during the 
panic compared to states in the South or East, with the exception of a 
few eastern states (especially New York) with close ties to the North- 
west. 
Persistent declines in western land values and commercial distress in 
the Northwest coincided with a rapid reversal in the rate of immigration 
to the West. Fishlow attributed falling western land values and depre- 
ciation of western railroad securities after 1857 to declining immigra- 
tion. The decline in immigration from the East is impressive. "For six 
major East-West arteries traversing Ohio the number of through pas- 
sengers declined from 581,000 in 1857-58 to 367,000 in 1859-60.... The 
difference between western and eastern through passengers on lines 
entering Chicago from the east, a measure of net migration, declined 
from an estimated 108,000 passengers in 1856 to a mere 10,000 in 1860.9'19 
Stephen Salsbury provided annual data on the total number of through 
passengers (in both directions) carried by the Western Railroad, which 
shows a similar pattern. The total number peaks in 1856 at 63,246, falls 
to 47,637 in 1858, and declines to 41,674 in 1860.20 
Thus the asset declines that preceded the panic were confined to a 
special class -of investments in the West and did not reflect a general rise 
in securities risk or a contraction of foreign credit. Moreover, these 
asset declines occurred quickly and were concentrated in mid-1857, 
with an acceleration of decline from August through mid-September. 
What caused the rapid reversal in the perceived profitability of 
westward expansion? Recent work by James Huston has stressed that 
the Panic of 1857 coincided with a severe agricultural decline in the 
Northwest that other regions did not share.21 Huston suggested that the 
declining international demand for grain in the aftermath of the Crimean 
War and the increasing international demand for cotton can explain both 
the onset of the panic and the regional differences in average growth 
during this period. Huston contended the fall in wheat prices in August 
and September 1857 represented the inevitable decline of foreign 
demand after the Crimean War. This seems unlikely for several reasons. 
First, the effect of the war's ending should have been reflected in wheat 
price declines as early as late 1856. Indeed, wheat prices fell precipi- 
18 Ibid., p. 54. 
19 Fishlow, American Railroads, pp. 202-3. 
20 Salsbury, The State, The Investor, and the Railroad, p. 308. 
21 Huston, "Western Grains," and The Panic of 1857. 
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TABLE 2 
COMMERCIAL FAILURES, JANUARY 1857-MARCH 1858 
Percentage of Average Loss Estimated 
Businesses Rate on Creditors' 
Area Failinga Failuresa Loss Rateb 
NORTHEAST 
Connecticut 1.68 0.58 0.9744 
Maine 1.27 0.53 0.6731 
Maryland (outside Baltimore) 1.11 0.76 0.8436 
Massachusetts (outside Boston) 1.57 0.51 0.8007 
New Hampshire 1.97 0.48 0.9456 
New Jersey 2.46 0.56 1.3776 
New York (outside New York City) 4.09 0.62 2.5358 
Pennsylvania (outside Philadelphia) 2.08 0.73 1.5184 
Rhode Island 1.85 0.67 1.2395 
Vermont 2.28 0.50 1.1400 
Philadelphia 4.40 0.74 3.256 
New York City 6.15 0.65 4.000 
Baltimore 3.38 0.74 2.501 
Boston 5.61 0.55 3.086 
NORTHWEST 
Illinois 2.80 0.62 1.7360 
Iowa 5.63 0.64 3.6052 
Indiana 2.51 0.66 1.6566 
Michigan 3.80 0.76 2.8880 
Ohio 2.54 0.68 1.7272 
Wisconsin 4.52 0.51 2.3052 
Territories 2.57 0.80 2.0560 
BORDER STATES 
Kentucky 1.46 0.75 1.0950 
Missouri 1.37 0.68 0.9316 
Tennessee 1.37 0.59 0.8083 
SOUTH 
Arkansas 1.51 0.55 0.8305 
Florida 0.88 0.54 0.4752 
Georgia 1.01 0.78 0.7878 
Louisiana 1.94 0.63 1.2222 
Mississippi 0.58 0.63 0.3654 
North Carolina 2.08 0.70 1.4560 
South Carolina 1.96 0.62 1.2152 
Texas 0.50 0.72 0.3600 
Virginia 1.32 0.61 0.8052 
Figures include "frauds" as well as other failures. 
b This is estimated as the product of the preceding two columns. 
Source: The American Commercial Agency, "Statement of Failures for 1857," in Evans, The 
History of the Commercial Crisis, pp. 136-37. 
tously beginning October 1856 (Table 3) but rebounded in July and 
August, reaching levels comparable to, or exceeding, those of July and 
August 1856. Only in September did prices begin to fall rapidly. Second, 
widespread reports throughout the financial press of a bumper wheat 
crop in 1857 provide an alternative explanation for the early decline in 
wheat prices of July and August. The seasonal pattern in wheat prices 
for the years 1841 to 1860 indicates that prices typically rose from 
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TABLE 3 
CHICAGO AND LONDON WHEAT PRICES, 1856-1857 
London' 
Chicagoa per Imperial Quarter 
cents/bushel s. d. 
1856 
January 132 76 6 
February 115 72 6 
March 108 68 11 
April 116 68 8 
May 110 68 0 
June 103 69 6 
July 104 76 1 
August 104 72 10 
September 100 67 10 
October 90 65 5 
November 77 64 1 
December 81 60 3 
1857 
January 88 58 7 
February 90 56 0 
March 88 55 6 
April 100 53 8 
May 114 56 7 
June 124 60 1 
July 120 63 4 
August 103 59 6 
September 85 57 0 
October 73 55 5 
November 61 51 3 
December 55 48 7 
a The average of the monthly high and low. 
b The average of weekly prices. 
Sources: Chicago prices are from Boyle, Chicago Wheat Prices, p. 69. London wheat prices are 
from Statistical Abstractfor the United Kingdom, p. 100, which was kindly provided to the authors 
by Jonathan Hughes. 
November to May, and often peaked in May and June. In years of 
bountiful harvests, prices fell precipitously from July to September, 
while in years of small harvests, prices may have remained flat or even 
rose over this period. For example, from June to August of 1854, 1859, 
and 1860, wheat prices fell 34, 37, and 23 percent, respectively, 
compared to a 17 percent decline from June to August 1857. The average 
seasonal decline from June to August for 1841-1860 was 12 percent. 
Third, a comparison of British and American price changes (Table 3) 
shows that reduced foreign demand could not have explained the fall in 
prices in the summer of 1857. British prices fell very little from August 
to October 1857. Indeed, this price decline is less than the fall in the 
wheat price from August to October 1856, or from October 1856 to 
January 1857. This is consistent with viewing news of the Crimean War 
and foreign-demand contraction as having its effect much earlier than 
the panic, and seeing the primary impetus for the U.S. price fall of July 
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and August as a response to the bumper crop. The continuing U.S. price 
declines during and after the panic reflected the liquidity crunch of 
western farmers. Declining national income during and after the panic 
reduced demand at a time when farmers were forced to increase sales. 
In the face of falling land values and the farm debt crisis, farmers must 
have been willing to liquidate their assets, including grain, at reduced 
prices. 
If the end of the Crimean War did not cause the western land and 
railroad bust, what did? The answer may lie in the political struggle 
between "free soil" and slavery in the territories. Beginning with the 
Dred Scott decision of March 6-7, 1857, the prospects of free-soil 
interests deteriorated, and uncertainty about the ultimate status of the 
territories grew. This reduced the territories' attractiveness to new 
immigrants, especially from the populous North, and reduced the 
probability of the establishment of further settlements west of the 
territories, or of government involvement in a transcontinental railroad 
through Kansas. Such an explanation is difficult to prove, but the 
coincidence between political news and securities' price movements is 
suggestive. The salient political news of 1857 included the Dred Scott 
decision of March 6-7 (which declared the Missouri Compromise 
unconstitutional); a defeat for pro-slavers on April 8 in the St. Louis 
mayoral election, which led observers to expect the loss of a Senate seat 
by pro-slavers; the June election of a constitutional convention for 
Kansas, rigged in advance by the minority pro-slave group; and the 
anticipation of a legislative election in October, again rigged by pro- 
slavers, which was later overturned by the territorial governor. By July 
Kansas was gripped by political uncertainties that dampened immigra- 
tion, land speculation, and prospects for railroad expansion. While it is 
difficult to match political events to securities' price movements con- 
vincingly, we note that Kansas land warrant and western railroad 
securities' prices declined slightly just after the Dred Scott decision in 
early March, then recovered at the time of the April 8 election of a 
free-soiler as mayor of St. Louis, declined again until the June election, 
and declined drastically in August and September. These movements 
are consistent with our view that political news about the future of the 
territories called the tune in the land and railroad-securities markets.22 
LINKING THE LAND AND RAILROAD BUST TO THE BANKING SYSTEM 
Some historians have assumed a causal link between the collapse of 
Ohio Life, with its powerful New York office, and the general suspen- 
22 Some of the most useful reviews of the political struggle between the North and South over 
Kansas include Cashin, A Family Venture; Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law and Politics; Nevins, The 
Ordeal of the Union; Potter, The Impending Crisis; Ransom, Conflict and Compromise; and 
Wright, Political Economy. 
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sion of New York City banks. The early timing of the Ohio Life failure 
seemed to link it to subsequent suspensions through some form of 
irrational contagion. But Ohio Life had few characteristics of a com- 
mercial bank, its collapse was attributed to special circumstances- 
mismanagement, or possibly fraud-at the time of its failure, and other 
banks did not suffer from its demise. Its failure predated by one-to-two 
months suspensions of other banks. Nevertheless, the early failure of 
Ohio Life is instructive because it illustrates the connection between the 
securities market decline and the fortunes of intermediaries. 
Ohio Life, which had struggled against heavy bank taxes in the 1850s, 
had nevertheless reported profits of up to 8 percent in the years 
preceding the panic. Its assets consisted mainly of securities and loans 
to railroads. Gripped by "railroad fever" that swept the state, Ohio Life 
had a special connection to the Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Dayton 
Railroad whose dividends were payable at Ohio Life. Other railroads 
likely enjoyed a similar status. To facilitate involvement in the securities 
market, Ohio Life had opened a New York office, under the direction of 
Edward Ludlow.23 
Ludlow's activities immediately prior to the bank's collapse remain 
murky, but their consequences for Ohio Life's asset portfolio are clear. 
Ludlow had loaned an amount equal to the company's capital-$2 
million-to various railroads, including $500,000 to the Cleveland & 
Pittsburgh.24 The report of the receiver of the bank shows the bank 
holding securities with a nominal par value in excess of $1 million.25 
Thus of its roughly $4.8 million in assets, the bank invested $3 million in 
the railroad industry. After the suspension of the bank, the president of 
Ohio Life, Charles Stetson, immediately launched an investigation. He 
apparently did not know what Ludlow had done, indicating Ludlow 
acted on his own authority.26 It remains unclear the extent to which 
Ludlow's actions were contrary to bank policy, the extent to which they 
involved fraud, and whether Ludlow simply made risky loans and 
investments on behalf of the bank, or whether he "borrowed" funds for 
his own purposes. Nevertheless, given Ohio Life's immediate western 
railroad connections, and that at least one-fourth of its capital was tied 
up in a single faltering western road (the Cleveland & Pittsburgh stock 
fell from 39 cents a share in July to 20 cents a share in August before the 
failure of Ohio Life, and later dropped to 15 cents a share), it is 
understandable that of all the banks in the country Ohio Life would be 
first to fail. Its fate reflected an underlying problem in the railroad and 
23 Haeger, The Investment Frontier, pp. 43-59, 143-144. Actually, a group of easterners owned 
both Ohio Life and the New York Life and Trust, so it was hardly a case of westerners' branching 
in the east. 
24 Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 28, 1857. 
25 U.S. House of Representatives, "Synopsis of the Report," pp. 206-7. 
26 Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 25, 1857. 
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TABLE 4 
MODAL BANK NOTE DISCOUNT RATES IN NEW YORK CITY IN 1857 
Alabama Georgia Virginia New York Ohio 
July 29 1.5a 1 1 3/8 1.25 
September 16 3 2.5 2.5 3/8 4 
October 7 10 10 10 1 8 
November 4 7 7 15 _b 6 
November 18 6 6 8 0.5 5 
November 25 6 5 6 3/8 3 
December 10 3 5 6 3/8 2.5 
December 22 3 4 6 3/8 2.5 
a New entrants were quoted at 5 percent and are excluded. 
b Transactions limited by Clearing House policy. 
Source: Thompson's. 
land markets in the West, to which it was known to be especially 
sensitive. This explains why its failure did not precipitate a general run 
on banks in New York, Ohio, or elsewhere. 
THE RAILROAD SECURITIES DECLINE AND THE EASTERN BANKS 
Interest rates rose in New York from June through August 1857. Still, 
markets remained calm. Discount rates on bank notes of distant states 
trading in New York and Philadelphia remained unchanged until late 
August and rose slightly after the collapse of Ohio Life (Table 4). New 
York bank stock remained firm until late September. The central puzzle 
of the panic is the links among the early securities markets' decline, the 
later decline in bank note prices and bank stocks, and the eventual 
suspension of convertibility. Why should a region-specific shock to 
western land and railroads cause a nationwide suspension originating in 
the East, and why the protracted delay in the reaction of bank note 
discount rates, bank stock prices, and bank suspension to the July- 
September decline in land and railroad securities? 
In our view, the adverse consequences of the initial "shock" were 
viewed as small (relative to aggregate bank capital) and were likely 
confined to only a few banks. Uncertainty about which banks ultimately 
might fail (given asymmetric information between banks and their 
depositors) led initially to relatively minor concerns over banks in 
eastern financial markets, and there was not a large perceived risk of 
general suspension, even at the time of the suspensions of late Septem- 
ber in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. 
Three destabilizing elements combined to transform the securities 
collapse into a banking panic. First, the initial increase in bank risk 
prompted some noteholders and depositors in New York state to 
convert their bank debt into specie. New York's free banks met this 
demand through sales of bonds in New York, which helped to depress 
bond prices further. 
The Panic of 1857 819 
Second, New York banks outside New York City converted their 
notes into specie mainly through their city correspondents. A regulation 
of June 1857 regulated city banks' trading in country notes, restricted 
the discount rate which city banks could charge, and limited the amount 
of notes that could be returned to peripheral banks without sufficient 
notice. This regulation, along with rising bank risk, caused a flood of 
peripheral banks' notes into the city for redemption. This added to the 
drain of specie from New York City to its correspondents in other 
eastern financial centers. 
Third, as New York City banks came to doubt the solvency of some 
prominent securities dealers, and as city banks' gold reserves fell in 
response to the accelerating demand for redemption of peripheral 
banks' notes, the city banks refused to rollover the debt of the brokers. 
This forced brokers to sell their bond holdings at rock bottom prices and 
forced many into bankruptcy. As these bankruptcies mounted, and as 
securities prices continued to fall, the solvency of New York City 
banks-whose loans to brokers and dealers often were backed by 
bonds-came into question. This was the proximate cause of the run on 
the city banks in mid-October. Thus the declining fortunes of western 
railroads and declines in western land values, along with a concentra- 
tion of asset risk and reserve drain in New York City banks, ultimately 
explain the origins of the panic. 
Evidence to support this account comes from securities and bank 
note prices, flows of funds into and out of the city banks, and the timing 
of broker failures and bank suspension. By the first week of September, 
discount rates on bank notes trading in New York City doubled for 
many banks, but they remained low. They rose from 1 to 2 percent on 
Ohio banks, and from 1/8 to 1/4 percent on New England banks. 
Discount rates on Pennsylvania and Maryland banks, and banks in the 
South, remained unchanged.27 Within the next week, despite a few 
significant failures by banks and brokers, New York City's banks on the 
whole "remained unshaken" as "little or no panic had seized depositors 
or noteholders."28 On September 12 it was learned that the Central 
America, a ship carrying $1.5 million in gold from California, had sunk 
en route to New York, but this had little effect on prices. 
In the succeeding two weeks, however, with the suspension of banks 
in Philadelphia, discount rates in New York City rose to levels substan- 
tially above normal for banks in every state, indicating an increased fear 
of possible nationwide suspension. Still, discount rates remained low 
for most states through the third week of September: 1/4 percent for 
New England, 3/8 percent for New York banks outside of New York 
City, 3 percent for most of the South, and 4 percent for Ohio. Interior 
27 Thompson's, 1857, various issues. 
28 Cook, "Annual Report," p. 112. 
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states generally had higher discount rates, but 10 percent was the 
maximum observed for any state.29 
During September increased risk coincided with conversions of bank 
debt into specie, but these conversions in New York were not sudden 
and would not be described accurately as a run. For New York's 
interior banks there were substantial note redemptions. These took 
place mainly in New York City, were precipitated partly by a regulatory 
peculiarity of New York's banking system, and were not associated 
with substantial default risk. The discounts on interior New York bank 
notes (except for banks in receivership) never exceeded 1 percent, even 
after suspension of convertibility in October. But even this small 
discount justified a large amount of note conversions in the city. Each 
New York bank was required by law to assign a bank as its agent in New 
York City (or Albany). The agent was required to maintain convertibil- 
ity of the bank's notes at no greater than a 1/4 percent discount. City 
bank agents made markets in interior banks' notes, but were not allowed 
to return notes to their source without some notice. During normal times 
market discounts were typically 1/8 or 1/4 percent, so few notes flowed 
to the city, and they could be returned roughly as quickly as they 
arrived. When perceived risk rose in September and October, even 
though only slightly, it justified large flows of notes to the city. Since all 
New York state banks had to maintain conversion there, it was easy for 
note arbitragers to bring all interior banks' notes to the city for 
redemption (rather than carry each note to its home office) and make a 
profit on the slight difference between the legally required discount rate 
and the market rate. Because regulation limited the amount that any 
agent could present for redemption, city banks accumulated large 
amounts of interior bank notes. 
New York City banks did require interior banks to redeem their 
notes, insofar as they could, but redemptions by peripheral banks took 
the form of checks on other New York City banks, not specie, and 
therefore, did not eliminate the specie drain on the city banks. Interior 
free banks sold their bonds, which had been deposited with the state 
government as backing for their notes, and used the proceeds (which 
took the form of checks on city banks) to redeem their notes from their 
city agents. As the crisis wore on, government regulations on note 
clearing operated as a destabilizing mechanism for propagating initial 
uncertainty by draining specie from the country's main banking reser- 
voir, the New York City banks. It also contributed to the declining value 
of bonds through the increased supply of bonds sold by interior banks to 
redeem notes. This further exacerbated the risk of brokers whose assets 
were mainly in the form of securities. 
After September 25-when the Bank of Pennsylvania failed, and 
29 Thompson's, 1857, various issues. 
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other Philadelphia banks suspended-specie outflows from New York 
City banks to redeem interior notes increased. From September 26 to 30 
more than $500,000 in notes were redeemed; between October I and 13 
some $2 million in interior notes were redeemed. At the time of 
suspension of convertibility in New York City (October 13), banks there 
held some $7 million in interior bank notes.30 
It is unclear how important New York's note redemption law was in 
causing the panic. Earlier suspensions in other eastern cities argue 
against viewing the regulation as an essential cause of suspension. 
Nevertheless, note redemptions by city banks were a substantial source 
of reserve outflow in the crucial weeks prior to the panic. City banks 
struggled to maintain their reserves in the face of a persistent demand 
for specie and were forced to contract loans. Contraction in city banks' 
loans and deposits was substantial from August 22 to October 10, 
particularly as this was normally the season for expansion. Loans fell 
from $120 million to $102 million, and deposits fell from $89 million to 
$63 million, while specie reserves increased slightly from $10.9 million 
to $11.5 million.3' 
Many city banks' borrowers clamored for assistance. Brokerage 
houses were particularly needy, but also especially risky, borrowers. It 
was clear that failure to rollover large amounts of loans coming due on 
October 4 to these borrowers could have adverse consequences in all 
financial markets-through its effect on securities prices and conse- 
quent effects on call-loan collateral-and so the Clearing House banks 
of New York City met on September 29 to reassure everyone that such 
credit would be forthcoming. 
This promise, however, was not kept due to a combination of the city 
banks' inability to do so (due to the persistent gold outflow) and their 
unwillingness to do so (given the rising threat of insolvency for brokers). 
The contraction of credit forced more and more securities houses into 
liquidation. On October 3 the respected firm of E.W. Clark, Dodge, and 
Company failed (in which Jay Cooke was a partner). While discount 
rates rose and banks contracted, still there was no run. On October 10, 
however, the surprised New York market saw several railroad compa- 
nies and the securities firm Corning and Company fail. Corning alone 
owed several million dollars to the city banks at the time of its failure. 
Anticipating panic, the Clearing House passed a resolution on October 
12 pledging to maintain convertibility. But, like its earlier promise, this 
was not credible, and depositors' concerns were not allayed. 
When New York City banks opened for business on October 13, an 
unprecedented run by depositors greeted them. Before agreeing to 
suspend, the banks paid out between $4 million and $5 million. Wall 
30 Cook, "Annual Report," p. 113. 
31 Thompson's, 1857, various issues. 
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Street literally was filled with depositors hurrying to withdraw their 
funds. "The banks went down before a storm they could not postpone 
or resist."32 Between October 1 and October 13 deposits had fallen by 
$10 million. Roughly half of the specie held by city banks on October 10 
was paid out on October 13. 
TRANSMISSION TO OTHER STATES 
Suspension of convertibility in New York City was followed by 
suspension in the rest of New York state and most parts of the country. 
Many banks in other regional centers relied on New York, either 
directly or indirectly, as a reserve center. The suspension of convert- 
ibility in New York City, along with that of other northeastern financial 
centers, effectively reduced banks' reserve holdings. In Ohio, for 
example, this reduced reserves by half.33 
Furthermore, the scramble for specie by suspended banks in Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore, and New York City threatened runs on banks that 
remained open in the rest of the country. Bankers and local business- 
men feared their banks would be run to provide specie for other locales. 
Often suspension of convertibility came at the behest of merchants who 
organized citizens' meetings to demand bank suspension. Such influen- 
tial meetings occurred in New York, Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia.34 
In Virginia suspension came in two waves, and in both cases it was 
defensive. After the suspension of Philadelphia banks on September 26, 
banks in the western part of the state, which had the strongest financial 
ties with Pennsylvania banks, suspended. The Bank of the Valley, 
Wheeling, suspended on September 28 with the encouragement of the 
city's citizens, who feared withdrawals by Pennsylvanians.35 Banks in 
eastern Virginia did not suspend at that time. The out-of-state interbank 
holdings of Richmond and Norfolk banks, like those of other southern 
coastal city banks, were in New York. These banks and their counter- 
parts in Augusta, Savannah, and Charleston continued to maintain 
convertibility until suspension in New York.36 
In Georgia general bank suspension occurred immediately after that 
of New York and Charleston, and the motivation was described 
explicitly as a defensive response to actual and potential pressures from 
the North.37 Georgia's coastal cities' banks maintained large interbank 
32 Cook, "Annual Report," p. 115. 
3 The ratio of specie to specie plus interstate deposits was 0.53 on average for Ohio. See 
Calomiris, "Microeconomic Data." 
3" Ecke, "Fiscal Aspects," pp. 8-85, 92-94, 119. 
35 Ibid., p. 81. 
36 Ibid., pp. 82, 118-20. In anticipation of New York's suspension, some banks suspended as 
early as Oct. 12. 
37 Huston, in The Panic of 1857, pp. 22-23, cited articles that explained suspension as a defensive 
action from the Richmond Enquirer on Oct. 16, and the Mobile Daily Reporter on Oct. 17. 
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balances with the banks of Charleston, who in turn had large New York 
balances. Once the banks of Savannah and Augusta had followed 
Charleston's lead, the rest of the Georgia banks followed, again at the 
behest of their citizenries.38 
Only two banks in Alabama suspended-the Central and Commercial 
banks-both entrants in 1857, while older banks opted to remain open 
and weather the storm.39 The lack of ties between Alabama and New 
York financial markets may have insulated Alabama from dependence 
on northern deposits and the risk of northern withdrawals. Similarly, 
New Orleans and Kentucky avoided suspension. 
Bank suspension was not necessarily a sign of weakness. Maryland 
and Pennsylvania banks suspended with little effect on note discount 
rates in New York. Similarly, Charleston's bank notes circulated 
throughout the South during the suspension at par with specie.40 
Indeed, the failure to suspend in response to persistent statewide bank 
runs can have far more serious consequences than a suspension. If to 
maintain convertibility banks call in loans from borrowers, they may 
cause customers to go bankrupt or to sell off merchandise at "fire sale" 
prices, which can result in bank losses as well. Suspension did not force 
banks to shut down; it allowed banks to choose which deposits and 
notes to redeem and permitted them to accumulate reserves gradually, 
without calling in loans en masse. Suspension also allowed banks to 
allocate reserves among themselves to the best use.4' 
In some states the authorities took a dim view of suspension. Joseph 
Brown, Georgia's antibank governor, attempted to enforce loss-of- 
charter penalties on suspending banks. But in Georgia, as elsewhere, 
the voices of reason prevailed. The legislature understood the futility of 
penalizing Georgia banks, the victims of a financial crisis imported from 
the North. It permitted a one-year suspension without penalty over the 
governor's veto.42 
In Virginia distaste for suspension led the state legislature to enact a 
law in 1859 to insulate banks from future crises in the North. The 
ingenious law allowed banks to redeem their demandable obligations in 
the form of either specie or drafts on financial-center banks. In the event 
of a suspension in other states, the out-of-state deposits of Virginia 
38Ibid., p. 119. 
39 We infer this from the inaugural address of Alabama's Governor Moore of Dec. 1, 1857, in 
which he raised the possibility that these two banks might be penalized for suspending convert- 
ibility. See U.S. House of Representatives, "Extract from Governor Moore's," p. 196; Sch- 
weikart, Banking in the American South; Feiner, "Financial Structures"; and Schweikart, 
"Alabama's Antebellum Banks," pp. 202-21. 
40 Ecke, "Fiscal Aspects," p. 120. 
41 On interbank transfers during the post-War of 1812 bank suspensions, see Temin, The 
Jacksonian Economy, pp. 45-47. Below we discuss other examples. 
42 Heath, Constructive Liberalism, pp. 183-230. 
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banks were as good as specie for purposes of forestalling a run on their 
own banks.43 
New York allowed suspension of convertibility, so long as suspension 
was due to a liquidity crisis, like the Panic of 1857. An Act of 1849 
provided that "where a [suspended] bank is clearly solvent and its 
officers are acting in good faith, &c, no receiver should be appointed."44 
The law clearly distinguishes individual fraudulent behavior (for which 
banks should be punished) from systemic crises for which individual 
banks are not to blame. 
RESPONDING TO CRISIS: THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION 
An exhaustive summary of each state's response to the panic is 
beyond our scope. We focus on a few states to illustrate the importance 
of banking-system coordination in limiting liability depletion and bank 
failures during the crisis.45 New York City's Clearing House, coinsuring 
statewide coalitions of banks in Indiana and Ohio, and southern 
statewide branch-banking system provide examples of relatively suc- 
cessful responses to the panic and stand in contrast to other systems of 
many unit banks which were unable to coordinate as effectively, 
including free banks in Indiana and Tennessee and interior New York 
banks. 
New York 
Recovery from the panic was rapid in New York. By the end of 1858, 
banks had more than regained their pre-panic asset levels. In 1859 asset 
growth was flat. Long-run effects include more conservative capital and 
reserve ratios. From February 1856 to February 1860 banks increased 
their capital-asset ratios, from 0.33 to 0.40 for six cities outside 
Manhattan, and from 0.37 to 0.41 outside cities. Urban banks outside of 
Manhattan also showed an increase in interbank net deposits (from -1 
percent of assets to 4 percent of assets). Conversely, banks in Manhat- 
tan decreased interbank deposits but kept total reserve ratios (specie 
plus net interbank deposits divided by assets) constant by raising specie 
from 5 to 8 percent of assets. 
The Clearing House coordinated the behavior of its members during 
and after the panic, hastened resumption, and minimized the costs of the 
crisis. On November 7 the Clearing House banks resolved to require 
country banks to resume convertibility at 1/4 percent, beginning No- 
vember 20, while the city banks agreed not to request immediate 
redemption of all interior bank currency. City banks held sealed 
"4 "Law of Virginia in Relation to Banks," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 41 (1859), p. 596. 
44 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 37 (1857), p. 601. 
45 All balance sheet and bank failure data reported below are from Calomiris, "Microeconomic 
Data." 
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packages of interior bank currency totaling $7 million, to be redeemed 
at 20 percent per month, with 6 percent interest payable on the balances 
held in the interim. This increased bank reserves beyond available 
specie and made withdrawals from interior banks more orderly and 
predictable. The plan also sought to satisfy city banks' depositors that 
city reserve depletion would be reversed.46 
The Clearing House banks set December 11 as the date for resump- 
tion for themselves. By acting together they emphasized the collective 
nature of the problem and their resolve to meet the challenge as a group. 
Discount rates on interior banks' notes fully rebounded by late Novem- 
ber (Table 4). 
Although the Clearing House banks were instrumental in the recovery 
of the banking system, one might fault them for postponing suspension 
in the face of massive mercantile failures. Had they suspended in 
mid-September or even early October, they might have been able to 
extend the necessary loans to keep the securities market afloat. Focus- 
ing on their banks' reputations, rather than the health of the markets as 
a whole, the bankers chose the path of tight credit, falling prices, and 
commercial failures. 
Of the 285 banks in New York in operation in September 1857, 19 
failed during the panic.47 Of the three failed banks located in New York 
City, the Mechanics Banking Association soon reopened, while the 
other two-the Bowery Bank and the Island City Bank-suffered 
respective discounts of 0 and 0.25 percent on their notes and ultimately 
redeemed their circulation at par.48 Failed banks outside Manhattan saw 
higher losses. Interestingly, Safety Fund banks in the periphery were 
more likely to fail than interior free banks, and the degree of losses 
conditional on their failing was higher. Only 6 of the 221 interior free 
banks in existence in September 1856 failed, while 3 of the 41 interior 
Safety Fund banks failed. Discounts on failed free banks averaged 0.75 
percent, while discounts on the three failed Safety Fund banks averaged 
37 percent. Individual banks-those with bond-backed circulation and 
unlimited liability to the banker-were the most likely to fail (8 out of 
35), but average note discount rates (2.25 percent) on failed individual 
banks were low compared to Safety Fund banks. 
What is puzzling about these relatively large noteholders' losses for 
the Safety Fund banks is that their note discounts in New York, Boston, 
Baltimore, and Philadelphia prior to the panic were identical (indeed, a 
little lower on average) to those of free banks and individual banks. How 
46 Cook, "Annual Report," p. 119. 
4 Another free bank, the Powell Bank in Newburgh, is listed as "closed" during this period. Its 
notes were discounted 1 percent and no receiver or deadline for redemption appears in the note 
reporters. Listings of failed banks from other sources-like New York's Sound Currency, Feb. 1, 
1895, p. 303-do not include the Powell Bank in their list. 
48 Sound Currency, Feb. 1, 1895, p. 303. 
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can one reconcile the similar evaluation of risk ex ante with the 
difference in losses ex post? A possible answer is the novelty of the 1857 
crisis. As New York's Banking Superintendent pointed out, it was the 
first banking crisis in the United States of its kind. Earlier financial 
crises could be traced to the impact of war (as during and after the War 
of 1812) or to the policies of the Bank of England (which had prompted 
the Panic of 1837).49 No one had anticipated the course that the panic 
took. In particular, no one could have anticipated that the New York 
court would allow interior banks to withdraw all of their bonds on 
deposit at the banking department in order to redeem their notes. In 
fact, this was probably illegal, and the request to do so had been denied 
by the Superintendent prior to the ruling of the court. That ruling 
allowed free banks to meet the redemption requirement with relative 
ease, but it did not help the Safety Fund banks, since they did not have 
bonds on deposit at the banking department. Thus the Safety Fund 
banks were faced with a more costly convertibility requirement ex post, 
though neither the origins of the crisis nor the special dispensation for 
free banks was anticipated ex ante. This may explain the similarity in ex 
ante risk evaluation of free and Safety Fund banks, even though free 
banks performed better during the crisis. 
Ohio 
Ohio provides an interesting example of a banking system that 
performed well despite the shocks that buffeted western markets. In 
Ohio from 1856 to 1860 capital-asset ratios rose (from 0.25 to 0.28) for 
both insured and uninsured banks, and assets did not fully rebound in 
the two years after the panic. This likely reflects deterioration in Ohio's 
"fundamentals," rather than the failure of its banks to recover from the 
crisis. Ohio produced a quarter of the total wheat output of the United 
States during this period. The Warren-Pearson price index for farm 
products rose steadily from 59 in 1848 to 95 in 1857, only to fall to the 
mid-70s in 1858 and remain there for the rest of the decade. At the same 
time, the price index for all commodities rose from 82 to 111 from 1848 
to 1857, and then declined to the mid-90s for 1858-1860. Thus relative 
farm prices appreciated 19 percent from 1848 to 1857, declined 4.5 
percent in 1858, and remained flat until the 1860s.50 
Ohio avoided a general suspension through the cooperation of the 
network of mutually insured banks, which their (self-)regulator, the 
Board of Control, orchestrated. Ohio banks were especially vulnerable 
in 1857 because many of them had substantial eastern deposits on 
account with Ohio Life. Also, the law bound each member of the 
insured system to redeem the notes of all member banks, making each 
"4 Cook, "Annual Report," pp. 105-17. 
50 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, part 1, pp. 218-20. 
The Panic of 1857 827 
more accessible to withdrawal of specie by local residents. But coin- 
surance, along with actions by the Board of Control, compensated for 
these potential problems. First, the Board of Control acted quickly to 
insulate the banks from Ohio Life's failure. It transferred assets of the 
failed bank directly to its depositor banks to secure their deposits, 
effectively subordinating the debts of individual depositors and other 
creditors of Ohio Life to those of the Ohio banks. The board liquidated 
some of these assets to help keep banks afloat during the crisis.51 
Second, the board established a system of mutual liquidity insurance 
among the banks. Just three days after the failure of Ohio Life, the 
board determined it could minimize the impact of the failure by 
requiring banks to help each other during the crisis (rather than simply 
rely on ex post coinsurance).52 On August 29 the first letter from the 
secretary instructed the Commercial Branch in Cleveland to "render 
aid" in the amount of $15,000 to the Merchant's Branch of Cleveland. 
Over the next two months, four insured banks received $56,000 in 
assistance. These were interest-bearing loans, backed by collateral of 
time notes or paper currency. The sweeping powers of the Board of 
Control gave it the flexibility to react quickly to the crisis and with 
unquestionable authority. This timely action allowed all of the insured 
banks to maintain full convertibility throughout the crisis. They had a 
rapid recovery, and by the end of 1858 their average level of assets had 
nearly regained pre-panic levels. 
The beneficial effects of the Board of Control's policy went beyond 
the limits of the insured system. By establishing the credibility of the 
insured banks, the board avoided panic by the uninsured banks and their 
depositors, allowing other banks to draw on the insured banks to keep 
themselves afloat, and kept their holdings of insured banks' notes as 
good as gold for purposes of maintaining their own convertibility. The 
net interbank balance for all Ohio banks rose from November 1856 to 
February 1858, but this mainly reflected net loans from insured banks. 
Other banks increased their net interbank positions by $77,000 as a 
group, while the insured banks increased their net interbank balance 
from $368,000 in November 1856 to $670,000 in February 1858. This 
increase implies that loans to uninsured banks and repayments on 
deposits due to other banks were an important indirect benefit of 
cooperation among insured banks. 
Only I of the 54 Ohio banks-the Seneca County Bank, an uninsured 
"independent bank of moderate size"-failed in Ohio during the crisis. 
Judging from note discount rates the market also perceived the 
Sandusky City Bank as vulnerable, but the bank recovered and by 1859 
its notes traded at the same discount in New York as all other solvent 
5' Golembe and Warburton, Insurance of Bank Obligations, chap. 6, p. 30. 
52 Letterbooks of the Board of Control, MSS, Ohio State Museum, Columbus, Aug. 27, 1857, 
taken from Golembe and Warburton, Insurance of Bank Obligations, chap. 6, p. 29. 
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banks. Notes of the Seneca County Bank were discounted 80 percent.53 
This high a rate of loss seems inconceivable given the 100 percent bond 
backing required of independent and free banks for their note issues.54 
It appears, however, that independent banks, unlike free banks, may 
not have been required to deposit their bonds with the state auditor.55 
Violation of the bond reserve requirement possibly explains this high 
rate of noteholder loss. 
The success of Ohio banks in meeting the liquidity crisis appears in 
sharp contrast to some of their neighbors in Indiana. Of Indiana's 32 free 
banks in operation prior to the panic, 14 failed during the panic. The 
difference in the propensity to fail in the two states in 1857 cannot be 
attributed to a steeper decline in bond prices held by Indiana banks. 
Indiana's 5 percent bonds fell 14.6 percent from peak to trough during 
the panic, while Ohio's 6 percent bonds fell 16.7 percent from peak to 
trough. Both recovered to their pre-panic levels by the end of the year.56 
An explanation for the different propensities to fail may be found in 
the relative lack of a coordination mechanism in Indiana. The insured 
banks in Indiana, like those in Ohio, maintained specie convertibility 
throughout the crisis. But unlike the insured banks in Ohio, Indiana's 
were in a state of flux throughout the 1850s and in no position to aid the 
free banks or to coordinate their behavior. The charters of the first 
system of Indiana insured banks (the "branches" of the State Bank of 
Indiana) expired at the beginning of 1857. In 1854 an effort to renew the 
charters failed. A second political battle was joined after the regional 
crisis of 1854-1855 to charter a new system of insured banks (the 
''branches" of the Bank of the State of Indiana). Many free bank 
failures in 1854-1855 made the insured system seem attractive by 
comparison, and this time the forces in favor of insured banking 
succeeded in securing a new set of charters. However, the Panic of 1857 
came too soon for these banks to have developed ties to the free banks. 
The old insured banks had closed, and the new insured banking network 
had only been operating for a few months. Interestingly, the free banks 
responded to the crisis of 1854-1855 with their own plans for coordina- 
tion. In June 1857 the free banks met to discuss forming a clearing house 
on New York's model. Unfortunately the panic came before they were 
able to do so. 
Evidence from note discount rates supports our interpretation of the 
difference between Indiana and Ohio. Philadelphia data, for which a 
5 Thompson's does not quote New York prices for this bank and refers to its notes as 
"unsalable." The 80 percent discount is a Philadelphia price taken from Van Court's, Dec. 1858. 
5 Ohio and U.S. bonds, which were required as backing for notes, fell no more than 16.7 percent 
before recovering their value. 
5 On their balance sheets independent banks reported "bonds of U.S. and State of Ohio," while 
free banks reported "state stocks deposited with Auditor." 
56 Thompson's, 1857, various issues. 
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consistent series is available for 1857-1858 from Van Court's Counter- 
feit Detector and Bank Note List, suggest that during the panic the notes 
of Ohio banks of all types traded at the same rate of discount (which 
varied over time from 1 to 10 percent in the Philadelphia market) with 
few exceptions. For Indiana the discount rates on all free banks' notes 
rose from 2 percent in September to 10 percent in October. By February 
1858, however, discounts on Indiana free banks' notes varied within the 
range of 5 to 30 percent, with a mode of 20 percent. At the same time, 
the discounts on the notes of the insured system had risen from 1.25 
percent in September to 5 percent in October, and had fallen to 3 
percent by December and 2 percent by February. These data indicate 
separate pricing of bank risk in Indiana, and common pricing of risk in 
Ohio, across the different charter types. This supports the view of 
Ohio's system as interdependent or coordinated, and Indiana's free 
banks as a system of "every bank for itself." 
The Branching South 
The antebellum South had no clearing houses. Six northern states 
experimented with bank coinsurance during this period, but no southern 
state did. While the South lacked these formal devices, it achieved 
coordination through informal agreements among smaller numbers of 
banks, made possible by branch banking, which was unique to the 
South. 
Data for Virginia show banks weathered the storm well. While all 
banks contracted from January 1857 to January 1858, the six banks with 
branches showed a rise in the ratios of deposits, and loans, to assets at 
a time when other banks' deposit and loan shares fell. Loan shares of 
branching banks rose from 0.72 to 0.74, while the average for the state 
fell from 0.49 to 0.46. By January 1859 banks had more than recovered 
from the asset depletion of the panic. Bank growth did not continue in 
1859. Virginia, like Ohio and New York, increasingly depended on the 
fortunes of the grain market and suffered by its decline. For example, 
the Bank of Rockingham-a unit bank located in Harrisonburg-saw its 
loans and deposits fall by roughly a third from January 1857 to January 
1860. Two of Virginia's 19 banks (operating 40 branches) failed during 
the panic: the Bank of Kanawha (a unit bank granted a special charter 
in 1839) and the Trans-Alleghany free bank. The former soon reorga- 
nized, and its notes traded in New York at 95 cents on the dollar. The 
latter bank's notes fell to 50 cents on the dollar. 
Data on Georgia banks tell a similar story. By the end of 1858, notes 
and deposits had exceeded their 1857 levels, though, as in other states, 
growth was flat afterward. Four out of 19 banks (operating 15 branches 
and agencies) closed during the panic. All four failures were unit banks. 
Two were new entrants, the other two were owned by George Smith and 
his partners to provide circulation in Illinois (and avoid Illinois' costly 
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regulations): the Atlanta Bank and the Interior Bank of Griffin-both 
chartered in 1854 without agencies or branches. These two banks, like 
many of Smith's other operations, most likely closed in anticipation of 
his retirement to Scotland in 1857.57 Notes of these two banks were 
discounted 3 percent after their closing. Thus of the four unit banks that 
closed during and after the panic, two were new entrants into banking, 
and two were retired. 
Data for other southern states show a remarkable degree of success in 
coping with the panic. In Alabama, the Carolinas, Louisiana, Kentucky, 
and Missouri no banks failed. A branch was converted into a separate 
bank in North Carolina; Kentucky added one bank and six branches; 
four banks entered in Louisiana; two in Alabama; and six banks and 
nine branches in Missouri. 
Tennessee, the southern state that relied most on free banking in the 
1850s, suffered seven bank failures and large noteholder losses, as 
indicated by discounts of between 10 and 75 percent on its failed banks' 
notes in New York, compared to discounts of I percent on survivors' 
notes. Of the banks that failed, four were free banks and the other three 
were individually chartered unit banks. By 1860 only 2 of the 21 banks 
chartered under the free banking law had avoided liquidation. In this 
light, the repeal of the free banking law in Tennessee in 1858 is 
understandable. Relative to its neighbors without free banking, Tennes- 
see had fared poorly during the panic, with free banks performing worst. 
In part, the favorable performance of the South during the panic 
reflects cooperation between banks and merchants who often helped to 
coordinate bank suspensions. Cooperation among banks was important 
as well. On October 20, 1857, banks in Charleston-a southern money 
center-agreed to receive each other's notes and the notes of other 
South Carolina banks and of Augusta and Savannah banks at par, 
effectively expanding the supply of reserves by making notes as good as 
gold for interbank transactions. 
In Alabama a small number of mainly urban banks cooperated during 
the crisis. Total deposits due from banks rose for the four banks in 
existence from 1857 onward, from $665,000 to $1.03 million from the 
beginning of 1857 to the beginning of 1858, while total deposits due to 
these banks fell from $703,000 to $564,000. This rise in net deposits due 
from banks may reflect the difficulty of obtaining funds from some 
out-of-state banks. The small percentage fall in deposits due to other 
banks (relative to public deposits) reflects cooperative behavior among 
Alabama's banks. Large banks (the Bank of Mobile and the Southern 
Bank of Alabama) doubled their balances due from other banks and 
reduced balances due to other banks by over $400,000. The Bank of 
Montgomery began 1857 with a net balance of interbank claims of 
57 Huston, Financing an Empire, vol. 1, pp. 113-14. 
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-$100,000 and ended it with a net balance of -$386,000. Similarly, in 
Georgia changes in interbank balances also indicate cooperative behav- 
ior. The three largest banks (the Georgia Railroad and Banking Co., the 
Central Railroad and Banking Co., and the Bank of the State of Georgia) 
increased their interbank balances by a total of $1.14 million, mainly by 
paying debts due to other banks. 
An analysis of aggregate interbank balances of southern states in 1857 
and 1858 suggests interbank transfers across, as well as within, state 
lines. In 1857 Virginia and Louisiana banks called in large amounts of 
deposits and borrowed heavily from other southern states in response to 
the crisis. New Orleans banks began 1857 with a positive net interbank 
balance of $5.4 million. By the beginning of 1858 the banks had reduced 
their net interbank balance to $2.7 million. Virginia's aggregate inter- 
bank balance fell from $1.7 million to $1.1 million over the same time. 
These negative changes in net interbank balances were offset by 
opposite changes in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
From September 1857 to March 1858, South Carolina reduced its 
out-of-state interbank balance by roughly $500,000. Georgia went from 
a $300,000 net debt in the beginning of 1857 to a $400,000 net credit by 
October of 1857, though nonreporting banks make it difficult to say 
whether this reflected changes across state lines. Tennessee's change 
was roughly $1 million, and Alabama's $600,000. This indirect evidence 
indicates a reallocation of bank balances across state lines, possibly to 
support troubled banks. Suspension did not close the banking system; 
rather, it gave banks flexibility to allocate reserves according to need. 
Cooperative behavior among southern banks goes back at least as far 
as the Panic of 1837, as Thomas Govan discussed in his study of 
Georgia. He found that early calls for suspension came from merchants, 
and that such local concerns translated into state- and regional-level 
banking policy by meetings and explicit arrangements among bankers.58 
The reliance on large branching banks in the South facilitated ad hoc 
cooperative planning. Contemporaries noted that the small number of 
large banks made it easier to cooperate. The banks of New Orleans and 
Kentucky and the insured banks in Indiana maintained convertibility 
during the Panic of 1857, and as Bray Hammond noted, New York state 
banks could not because they had many more players to coordinate.59 
Also, in banking systems with many geographically isolated banks, the 
costs of monitoring other coalition members' actions to enforce self- 
regulation is higher, and the benefits of monitoring are spread too thinly 
among many banks to permit incentive-compatible cooperation. In 
regional negotiations, like those described by Govan, the large branch- 
ing banks could speak confidently on behalf of all banks in their state 
58 Govan, "The Banking and Credit System," pp. 15-19. 
59 Hammond, Banks and Politics, p. 712. Also see Gibbons, The Banks of New York, p. 357; 
Dunbar, Economic Essays, p. 283; and McCulloch, Men and Measures, pp. 132-35. 
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because they had the ability to enforce cooperative behavior.601n this 
light, the coordination of northern banks through formal institutions like 
city clearing houses and deposit insurance systems can be viewed as 
necessities in the North, which followed from its reliance on unit 
banking.61In addition to the benefits of coordination, branching also 
brought stability by enhancing opportunities for diversification. As the 
experiences of New York, Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia 
demonstrate, small unit banks were most vulnerable. 
The importance of coordination in limiting bank suspension and 
failure is reflected in comparisons within and across states during the 
panic. Ohio's banks, Indiana's coinsuring banks, and southern branch 
banks in the Carolinas, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia 
outperformed unit banks-in particular Indiana's and Tennessee's unit 
free banks. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, Ohio, Georgia, the Caroli- 
nas, and Virginia suffered commercial distress during the panic equal to 
or in excess of that of Tennessee, but with far fewer bank failures. Our 
analysis of antebellum bank performance contrasts with that of Arthur 
Rolnick and Warren Weber, who viewed the causes of bank failures as 
exogenously determined by declines in asset values.62We would add to 
their analysis the potential for banking systems to limit the declines in 
asset values and to reduce the effects of such declines through cooper- 
ation. 
6 Govan, "The Banking and Credit System," pp. 19, 194. 
61 See Calomiris, "Deposit Insurance," and "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary?"; and White, 
"Political Economy." 
62 Rolnick and Weber, "The Causes of Free Bank Failures." 
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